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Abstract
Outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry in Vietnam continue to threaten the livelihoods of those reliant on poultry production whilst
simultaneously posing a severe public health risk given the high mortality associated with human infection. Authorities
have invested significant resources in order to control these outbreaks. Of particular interest is the decision, following a
second wave of outbreaks, to move from a ‘‘stamping out’’ approach to the implementation of a nationwide mass
vaccination campaign. Outbreaks which occurred around this shift in policy provide a unique opportunity to evaluate the
relative effectiveness of these approaches and to help other countries make informed judgements when developing control
strategies. Here we use Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) data augmentation techniques to derive the first
quantitative estimates of the impact of the vaccination campaign on the spread of outbreaks of H5N1 in northern Vietnam.
We find a substantial decrease in the transmissibility of infection between communes following vaccination. This was
coupled with a significant increase in the time from infection to detection of the outbreak. Using a cladistic approach we
estimated that, according to the posterior mean effect of pruning the reconstructed epidemic tree, two thirds of the
outbreaks in 2007 could be attributed to this decrease in the rate of reporting. The net impact of these two effects was a
less intense but longer-lasting wave and, whilst not sufficient to prevent the sustained spread of outbreaks, an overall
reduction in the likelihood of the transmission of infection between communes. These findings highlight the need for more
effectively targeted surveillance in order to help ensure that the effective coverage achieved by mass vaccination is
converted into a reduction in the likelihood of outbreaks occurring which is sufficient to control the spread of H5N1 in
Vietnam.
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza subtype H5N1 was first
identified in Vietnam in December 2003 [1] and was followed by a
major wave of outbreaks dispersed widely throughout the country
around the 2004 festival of Teˆ9t, a New Year celebration
representing a peak in annual poultry production and consump-
tion. Measures employed to control both this and a second wave of
outbreaks, occurring a year later, included a ‘stamping out’ policy
with compulsory mass ring culling of all poultry around an
outbreak carried out. This led to over 40 million poultry being
culled during the first wave alone, contributing to an estimated
direct national loss of US$ 200 million [2], a sharp decline in
demand for poultry products [3] and an estimated loss to affected
individual stakeholders of between US$ 69 and US$108 [4], an
amount exceeding the average monthly wage in Vietnam.
The resources and scale of destruction necessary to maintain
these measures and the repeated incursions of H5N1 which
occurred despite them resulted in a shift in policy in 2005 [5].
Following a field trial and pilot campaign in two test provinces,
a nationwide mass vaccination campaign began, using an H5N2
vaccine to inoculate chickens and a recombinant H5N1 vaccine
for ducks [6], with priority given to recently affected areas and
those with high human and poultry densities [7]. Approximately
160 million doses were administered twice a year costing close
to $US 21 million [8]. Although a third wave of outbreaks
coincided with the beginning of this campaign, a sero-survey of
poultry following vaccination estimated that a 60% level of
protective coverage had been achieved [6]. A nationwide ban
on the hatching of waterfowl was also enforced from February
2005 [7].
Following this third wave, Vietnam experienced a year during
which no outbreaks were reported. Despite follow-up vaccination
campaigns from August to November 2006 and March to June
2007, a fourth wave of outbreaks occurred in the South of
Vietnam in December 2006 and a fifth, beginning in late April
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2007, in the North, coinciding with the lifting of the ban on duck
hatching. During both of the latter waves, in order to minimise
losses to farmers, ring vaccination was carried out around each
reported outbreak and only flocks within which infection had been
identified were culled [2]. Detailed records were not kept during
the first two weeks of the first wave [5]. However, following the
implementation of systematic community-based and veterinary
surveillance and reporting networks as part of a detailed National
Action Plan [9], temporal and spatial outbreak data were collected
at a commune-level resolution for all subsequent waves, providing
a unique opportunity to assess the effects of the interventions, and
in particular country-wide vaccination.
Here we focus upon northern Vietnam, where data were
available for the sizeable waves occurring before, during and after
vaccination was implemented, with outbreaks generally concen-
trated around the high risk Red River Delta (RRD) region (Fig. 1).
However the analysis of this data is challenging because of the
inherent dependency between infection events (i.e. the risk of
infection of one commune depends on the infection status of all
neighbouring communes) and missing data issues (the time of first
infection of a commune is not known as only reporting dates have
been recorded). We therefore developed an inter-commune
transmission model, characterised by a spatial kernel describing
Author Summary
Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 continues to
spread rapidly between flocks of poultry in many parts of
the world including areas in Southeast Asia and Africa
where infection has become endemic. Meanwhile the
number of human cases and fatalities are steadily accumu-
lating. As a result, the control of outbreaks in poultry
remains both a key public and animal health priority. In
Vietnam control policies have evolved from a policy of
reliance upon drastic ‘‘stamping out’’ measures to regular
mass vaccination campaigns. Using Bayesian data augmen-
tation techniques in order to take into account the
unobserved infection times, we found that this has led to
a significant reduction in the daily probability of transmis-
sion between communes but that the time taken to detect
outbreaks has increased. As a result it is still possible for
sustained transmission to occur, albeit at a slower rate.
Through an analysis of the reconstructed epidemic tree, we
found that any measures that have the effect of restoring
detection capacity to that estimated for the ‘‘stamping out’’
policy would have a large effect upon the size and scale of
any future outbreak wave and may be effective at
preventing sustained transmission between communes.
Figure 1. Spatial and temporal distribution of outbreaks of H5N1 in poultry in northern Vietnam Dec 2004–Feb 2008. a, Commune-
level spatial distribution of reported outbreaks, b, Weekly incidence of outbreak reports in northern Vietnam. (As sufficiently accurate data on the
timing and location of outbreaks during the first wave is not available, figure shows data from the second wave onwards).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.g001
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how infectivity scales by distance and a parametric infection-to-
report distribution, in order to capture the spatial and temporal
dynamics of the spread of infection in the context of Vietnam
where the smallholding of poultry is commonplace. Bayesian
MCMC data augmentation methods which treat infection times as
nuisance parameters [10–14] were then used in order to impute
the missing infection times and fit this model to the observed
commune-level outbreak reports. This allowed us to explore the
changes which occurred between waves, both in terms of the
transmissibility between communes and the rate at which
outbreaks were detected. Next, through an analysis of the possible
chains of transmission (the ‘‘epidemic tree’’), we investigated how
changes in the rate of reporting outbreaks affected the size and
duration of the wave of outbreaks which occurred following the
implementation of vaccination.
Results
Our results suggest that the expected daily number of secondary
outbreaks generated by one infected commune varied little
between the waves occurring before and during the vaccination
campaign. However, during the 2007 wave, following vaccination,
this measure of spread reduced substantially as a result of a
significant reduction in the daily probability of transmission
between communes (Fig. 2a–c), with a joint posterior mean
estimate suggesting that, per head of poultry, infectivity was only
55% of that during the 2004/5 wave (Fig. 2d). Making the
assumption that changes in infectivity are caused by vaccination
and not influenced by other factors including changes in the
effectiveness of other control measures such as bio-security or
movement restriction, this can be compared to the effects of a
vaccination campaign achieving 55% uniform effective coverage
(where effective coverage refers to the overall vaccination coverage
multiplied by the protective efficacy of the vaccine).
In contrast, the infectious period of communes increased
significantly during the 2007 wave (Table 1 and Fig. 3b).
Consequently, despite the coincident reduction in the daily
transmission probability, the RRD region continued to sustain
infection (Fig. 3a and c), resulting in a wave which was lower in
intensity but longer lasting than the preceding two waves (Fig. 4a).
Overall, accounting for changes in the distribution of poultry
between the 2004/5 and 2007 waves, there was an 11% reduction
in the number of communes with estimated local reproductive
numbers (see Methods and Text S1) above unity The posterior mean
commune-level infectious period decreased from an estimated 5.9
days during the 2004/5 wave to just 4.7 days during the 2005
wave (Fig. 3b), coinciding with an increase in the level of
compensation provided to farmers with infected or depopulated
flocks [15]. As a result, despite the fact infection spread more
rapidly in the initial stages, the wave was brought under control
more rapidly than during the other two waves (Fig. 4a). There was
also a high proportion, relative to the other waves, of transmission
taking place over distances of less than 20km (Fig. 4b).
We assessed the robustness of our qualitative conclusions about
the changes in the dynamics of infection following vaccination to
different assumptions about the infectious period and effects of
control measures with detailed sensitivity analyses (see Text S1). We
were unable to explain the reduction in infectivity and increase in
Figure 2. Between-commune infectivity. a, Risk map of the expected daily number of secondary infections arising from infected commune
during each of the three waves, under the assumption all other communes remain susceptible. b, Plot of how the daily probability of between-
commune transmission scales with distance, c, Histogram of commune-specific daily rate of infection (only those over 0.5 plotted), d, Relative
changes in per-capita infectivity parameter b between waves with associated 95% credible intervals (see Text S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.g002
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the infectious period following vaccination by allowing outbreaks
to remain infectious for a longer time following a report or by
modelling non-constant infectivity throughout the infectious
period. We also found that the estimated reduction in the daily
probability of transmission (Fig. 2b) could not be attributed to a
decrease in the proportion of outbreaks detected.
Treating each outbreak as the root of a separate sub-epidemic
or ‘‘clade’’ [16], where a clade is defined to consist of all future
generations of outbreaks arising from an individual infection (see
Methods and Text S1), we explored the impact more effective
surveillance would have had upon the 2007 wave of outbreaks. We
made the assumption that this would have primarily resulted in the
earlier reporting of outbreaks estimated to have remained
unreported for the longest time.. We found that, had all outbreaks
been identified and successfully removed within two weeks of the
initial infection, the expected eventual size of the wave would have
Table 1. Posterior mean and 95% credible intervals for the baseline model fitted to each of the three outbreak waves.
Model Parameters 2004/5 2005 2007
Parameter Description Posterior mean (95% C.I.)
Spatial Transmissibility
b  106 Intensity 3.96 (0.45–14.5) 1.85 (0.75–4.88) 2.06 (0.57–6.02)
r Offset 3.46 (0.36–13.68) 0.83 (0.22–3.42) 0.77 (0.04–2.21)
a Power 2.14 (1.57–3.07) 2.02 (1.75–2.35) 1.81 (1.60–2.08)
Duration between infection and report
Q Shape 1.81 (1.24–2.75) 2.33 (1.71–3.21) 2.45 (1.49–4.54)
c Scale 3.37 (2.04–5.01) 2.09 (1.33–3.12) 3.98 (2.11–6.15)
Qc Mean 5.87 (4.59–7.40) 4.74 (3.84–5.91) 9.10 (7.29–11.21)
Qc2 Variance 20.04 (10.25–34.82) 10.09 (5.29–17.80) 36.29 (18.69–60.14)
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.t001
Figure 3. The infectious period and local reproductive numbers. a, Spatial distribution of local reproductive numbers calculated analytically
using the infectivity and infectious period estimates, b, Estimate of probability (assumed gamma) distribution of the infectious period during each of
the three waves, c, Histogram of local reproductive numbers for the three waves (only those with values greater than 0.8 plotted).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.g003
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been halved and the wave would have been eliminated twice as
fast, with an 18% probability that the wave would have become
extinct within the first 10 outbreaks. This probability rises to 20%,
with a 67% reduction in the size of the wave, if the rate of
detection had been maintained at that estimated for the 2004/5
wave (Fig. 4c), prior to the implementation of vaccination.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate the application of data augmentation
techniques to existing livestock disease modelling methodologies in
order to quantify the spatial and temporal spread of disease in a
setting where the times of infection are unobserved. We found
that, following the implementation of vaccination, the day-to-day
probability of infection spreading between communes has been
significantly reduced, with our estimate of a 55% effective
vaccination coverage agreeing with post-campaign sero-surveil-
lance [6]. However, we also found that the duration of time taken
to report outbreaks had also increased significantly, allowing
infection to spread. This result may support the hypothesis that
vaccination within a flock can contribute to the ‘‘silent spread’’ of
infection whereby a low-level of flock mortality or asymptomatic
infections can make outbreaks more difficult to detect [17,18] and
this was identified locally as an exacerbating factor in the spread of
infection [19].
There does, however, also appear to have been a shift in the
distribution of host species involved in outbreaks. During the
2004/5 wave, only 30% of outbreaks were identified in ducks
whereas in 2007 this figure rose to 77% [7]. This change has
previously been attributed to the lifting of a duck-hatching ban in
February 2007. Scavenging ducks traditionally play an important
role in the poultry production system and they have previously
been identified as being associated with outbreaks of HPAI [7].
Outbreaks also coincided with the end of rice-harvest season when
ducks are allowed to graze freely on rice paddies [20]. H5N1
infection in ducks has been shown to be less pathogenic than in
chickens, with clinical signs being less apparent and slower to
develop [21,22]. As a result, the concentration of infection within
duck flocks may have contributed to an elongated commune-level
infectious period. Changes in the transmissibility or reporting rates
of outbreaks may also be linked with other factors such as
differential vaccine efficacy or observed changes in the genotype of
the virus [23].
We found that a large proportion of transmission occurring
concurrently with the first round of vaccination took place over
relatively short distances. Such an increase could be due to the
movement of vaccinators who, it has been suggested, may have
acted as carriers of infection from one commune to another [5]. It
is also interesting that our estimates didn’t suggest a reduction in
the daily per-capita poultry transmissibility 2005, despite the
concurrent vaccination campaign which was taking place. This
may suggest that outbreaks predominantly occurred within large
regions yet to be vaccinated or in areas where vaccinated poultry
had yet to develop effective immunity.
We demonstrated how imputed infection times can be used to
explore all possible chains of infection and to assess the range of
possible effects which can be achieved by ‘pruning’ an outbreak
from the epidemic tree. Applying this to outbreaks occurring
during the 2007 wave, we found that if the reporting rates had
been maintained to those achieved during the previous waves, the
size and the duration of wave would have been considerably
diminished. This highlights that, in order to ensure that these
reductions in infectivity achieved through vaccination (Fig. 2a,c,d)
are translated into a noticeable impact on outbreak size, it is
essential that the infectious period of communes is shortened
(Fig. 3b) via improved surveillance and reporting. Measures
Figure 4. Reconstructing the epidemic tree. a, Temporal pattern of average reproductive numbers throughout the three waves, b, Proportion of
transmissions occurring at different distances for each of the three waves, c, Impact upon the 2007 wave of truncating the infectious period after a set
amount of time if an outbreak remains unreported, reflecting the time at which infection would be detected using more pro-active surveillance.
Columns show the estimated number of outbreaks which would have been averted as a result, the reduction in the time taken to control the wave
and the probability the wave would have been eliminated within the first ten outbreaks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.g004
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towards this have already been attempted in Vietnam with the trial
of a pro-active surveillance programme whereby resources are
allocated according to known risk factors such as the presence of
live bird markets and high semi-commercial farm density and a
prior history of outbreaks [24]. The programme also includes an
awareness campaign informing stakeholders about how outbreak
detection criteria should change following the vaccination of a
flock. An alternative approach is to use unvaccinated birds, or
those vaccinated with an inactivated heterologous strain of avian
influenza, as sentinels for the detection of the spread of infection.
This has been implemented under the Differentiating Infected
from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) guidelines in developed
countries such as Italy and the U.S. and has been successful in
helping to control outbreaks of low pathogenic avian influenza
(LPAI) [25,26].
Given the size of, and low-levels of biosecurity within, the poultry
industry and the ubiquity of poultry-keeping in Vietnam [27],
developing such detection capacity will involve overcoming a large
variety of logistical, economic and social issues [3]. However, in the
absence of such measures, sporadic outbreaks of the kind currently
being experienced in Vietnam, and the public health risks they
entail [28], seem set to re-occur for the foreseeable future.
Methods
Outbreaks of H5N1 in Vietnam prior to 2008 generally
occurred around two main foci, the Red River Delta in the North
of the country and the Mekong River delta in the South. Factors
such as the differing climates and poultry grazing patterns [5], as
well as the distinct genotypic profile of outbreaks which occur
within these regions [23] mean that transmission risk factors and
intensity are likely to vary between each region. As a result we
restrict our analysis to the Northern Red River Delta foci, the
region which has experienced the largest number of waves during
our study period. We define this region as the area of Vietnam
which lies north of the 18th latitude line, an area which comprises
6278 communes. We then defined three distinct waves of
outbreaks, the first beginning in 2004 before the initiation of the
vaccination campaign (2004/5 wave, 129 affected communes), a
second beginning in October 2005, coinciding with the first round
of vaccination (2005 wave, 271 affected communes) and a third
occurring in 2007 more than a year after vaccination had become
fully established (2007 wave, 152 communes affected).
We modelled these three waves as a spatio-temporal survival
process [29], with communes remaining susceptible until the day
of infection, becoming infectious from the day following infection
and then removed from the process either through mass culling
(for outbreaks occurring before the instigation of the vaccination
campaign) or a combination of ring vaccination and the culling of
infected flocks (following vaccination). Infectivity was assumed to
remain constant throughout the infectious period, with transmis-
sion occurring according to a per-bird intensity b, which scaled by
distance from the source of infection according to a two-parameter
spatial kernel,
k(r)~ 1z
r
r
 {a
,
with the time between the infection of a commune and the report
of an outbreak assumed to follow a gamma distribution. The scale
and shape parameters of this distribution, the three spatial
infectivity parameters, and each individual infection time were
fitted to the observed outbreak reports for each wave using a two-
step Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in order to obtain sufficiently
large samples of the posterior distributions. These were then used
to calculate the reproduction number of each commune and to
reconstruct and investigate the infection tree in a probabilistic
manner, allowing us to explore the possible effects of greater
detection capacity.
Data. Data on the outbreaks of H5N1 in Vietnam between
March 2004 and February 2008 were collected by the sub-
Departments of Animal Health for each of 64 provinces and city
municipalities in Vietnam and combined into a single database by
the Department of Animal Health in Hanoi. The database
contains the smallest administrative unit (hereafter referred to as a
commune although this can also be a town or ward) within which
the outbreak occurred and the date upon which each outbreak was
reported.
Spatial data in the form of a shapefile of the administrative
boundaries of Vietnam, to a commune-level resolution, were
obtained by the DAH from the Vietnamese Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment, as well as data on the human
population of each commune according to 2001 census data, and
annual poultry numbers at a provincial level resolution, obtained
from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam website.
Some infected communes reported multiple outbreaks during a
single wave. As the available data is at a commune level, we are
forced to ignore the possible impact of within-commune epidemic
dynamics. Therefore, based upon commune-level incubation
periods obtained from previous waves, we made the assumption
that in the case that a commune reported a secondary outbreak
within 14 days of a previous report the later report was attributable
to the earlier outbreak and the communes was assumed to have
remained infectious throughout. However, in a few cases (5/129
communes during the 04/05 wave, 8/271 in 2005 and 4/152 in
2007) outbreaks were reported more than 14 days apart. These
outbreaks were allowed to occur from external sources, the poultry
population of the commune was then split in half and outbreak
locations were generated randomly within the commune.
Parameter estimation. Each commune i was assigned a
location (xi,yi), calculated as the centroid of the commune, a date
of first infection ui and a date of removal ri from the outbreak
wave as a result of control measures or natural extinction (for ease
of notation, any commune which is not infected during an
outbreak wave is assigned an infection and removal time which is
arbitrarily later than the final outbreak removal time rmax).
Vectors associated with these times U~ u1,:::,uNf g and
R~ r1,:::,rNf gwere also defined, with N~6279, the number of
communes in the dataset north of the 18th latitude line.
Communes were also assigned a poultry population ni, a
fraction of the province-level poultry population proportional to
the number of people living in the commune.
From this we defined the instantaneous force of infection
experienced by a commune i at time t:
li(t)~
XN
i~0,i=j
bninjk
(dij)I(i is susceptible and j is infectious):
Here b is a third infectivity parameter to be estimated and k(dij)
is the value of the appropriately normalised kernel at dij , the
straight-line distance between communes i and j. Thus the
probability of avoiding infection until time t is
qi(t)~ exp {
ðt~t
t~0
li(t)dt
0
@
1
A
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and the probability the commune is infected on day t is
pi(t)~1{ exp {li(t)ð Þ:
If the times of infection and removal were observed then the
likelihood of the outbreak wave could be calculated as:
P(U ,Rjh)~P
N
i~0
qi(rmax)
1{I(uivrmax) qi(ui)pi(ui)f (ri{ui; c)ð ÞI(uivrmax)
n o
:
Here I(x)is the indicator function, f (t; c)is an assumed gamma
distribution of the duration of time between a commune first
becoming infected and the date an outbreak is reported (the
contribution of which to the likelihood, if infection and removal
times were observed, would be a constant multiplier) and h
denotes the set of kernel and duration between infection and
report parameters.
In Vietnam, it is possible to make rough estimates of the date an
outbreak is removed from the day of report and other information
such as official control policies and guidelines [30] (in the baseline
model this is assumed to occur the day following the report of an
outbreak). If the infection time of a commune was observed it
would also be possible to make an estimate of the time a commune
becomes infectious from previous experimental data [31].
However, the time between the infection of a commune and the
report of an outbreak is likely to vary widely between each
outbreak and depend upon a multitude of factors including the
type of farm involved, the size of the flock, the species of bird
involved, the background mortality previously experienced, the
willingness to report disease and the level of infection in the
vicinity of the infected premises. To overcome this problem a data
augmentation approach was used, with unobserved infection times
treated as nuisance parameters [13,14]. Using Bayes’ theorem, the
joint posterior distribution of the model parameters and
augmented infection times is:
P(h,U ,U0jR)!P(U ,Rjh,U0)P(U0)P(h)
where U0 is the index infected commune, with P(U0)a flat prior.
This was then sampled using a two-step MCMC algorithm,
initiated by randomly drawing putative infection times for each
outbreak from a uniform proposal in the interval between 1 and 30
days prior to date the outbreak was reported. The algorithm then
consists of a standard random-walk Metropolis Hastings sampler
to update the infectivity and time to report parameters, assuming
flat prior distributions, and an independence sampler of individual
infection times where the putative infection times of outbreak are
repeatedly proposed and updated with probability
min 1,
P(U{fujgzfuj g,Rjh,U0)
P(U ,Rjh,U0)
 
,
where U{fujgzfuj g is the set of infection times with the existing
imputed infection time of the selected commune j replaced with
the proposed time. Thus the probability of accepting a proposed
infection time takes into account both the estimated infection-to-
report distribution and the location, removal times and imputed
infection times of all other outbreaks (for further details of this
algorithm see Text S1).
Simulation study. To assess the ability of the fitting
procedure to accurately estimate transmission parameters, given
the validity of all the modelling assumptions, outbreaks of HPAI
were simulated over the spatial distribution of communes in
Vietnam. This was done by seeding an outbreak within a
commune in the high-risk Red River Delta region with an
infectious period drawn from a predefined gamma distribution.
Secondary infections were then chosen according to an infection
probability as described in the model, calculated using a
preselected set of parameter values and commune level poultry
populations estimated from the 2005 poultry population data.
Infectious periods for these communes were drawn from the same
gamma distribution as before. This procedure was repeated at
each time-step, representing a day of the outbreak wave, and
infected communes were removed from the dataset at the end of
their infectious periods. The simulation was continued until no
infectious communes remained.
50 datasets were generated using the transmission kernel and
infectious period shown in Fig. S3 and the 13 simulations where
the size of the outbreak exceeded 20 communes were selected.
Once simulated datasets had been obtained the fitting procedure
was applied, using only the spatial location and date of report of
each outbreak (entered as the day before the outbreak was
removed). The ability of the fitting procedure to recapture the set
of parameter values used to simulate the outbreak wave was then
assessed (results shown in Fig. 5).
Figure 5. Simulation study results. Parameters used during simulation of outbreaks waves (black line), estimates from the posterior mean of the
model parameters estimated from fitting the model to each simulated wave (dashed grey lines) and the overall mean of each of these estimates
(dashed red line) for a, the commune-level infectious period and b, infectiousness over space as described by the product of b and the spatial kernel.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.g005
Impact of H5N1 Vaccination in Vietnam
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 7 February 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e1000683
Calculating Risk maps. The local reproductive number of a
commune estimated from an outbreak wave is defined as the
number of secondary infections which could have been expected
to occur had the first outbreak of the wave occurred in that
particular commune, when all other communes remain susceptible
As a result these estimates incorporate the effects of existing
control measures. It can be obtained analytically [32] using the
expression:
Ri~E
X
j=i
m(dij)
" #
~
X
j=i
1{E 1{ exp ({bninjk
(dij)T
  
~
X
j=i
1{MT {bninjk
(dij)
  
~
X
j=i
1{
a
azbbninjk(dij)
 	 

here m(dij) is the probability that transmission occurs between an
infectious and susceptible commune dij apart at some time during
the infectious period, which is assumed to take the form of a
gamma distribution, T*C(a,b), with MT (x) the moment
generation function of this distribution. Similarly we calculate
the expected number of infections which would occur on the first
day of an outbreak, Li~
PN
j~0, j=i 1{ exp {bninjk
(dij)
  
.
Reconstructing the epidemic process
By drawing samples of infection times from the MCMC output
it is possible to calculate the marginal probability that any given
outbreak is infected by any other outbreak:
mij~
1{ exp {bninjk(dij)I(j is infectious on day i is infected)
 
PN
k~0
1{ exp {bninkk(dik)I(k is infectious on day i is infected)ð Þ½ 
It is then possible to calculate both the expected number of
infections arising from each individual outbreak commune and the
expected distance over which infection was transmitted (see Text
S1). Moreover, in order to assess the effects of earlier detection,
realisations of the potential epidemic tree (i.e. the unambiguous
chain of transmission where each outbreak is assigned a source
infector) can be repeatedly sampled for each set of infection times
by randomly selecting a source outbreak for each outbreak
according to these probabilities. From this, secondary infections
which arose between the ‘‘real-life’’ removal time of an outbreak
and a putative earlier removal time, occurring as a result of
improved surveillance, were identified, according to the assumed
impact of this surveillance. Then, by pruning clades of outbreaks
attributed to these secondary infections [16], the epidemic tree
which would have occurred as a result of the earlier removal time
is obtained (assuming pruned outbreaks would not have been
infected from alternative sources at a latter stage of the wave). This
form of analysis was used to assess the impact that the surveillance
scenarios listed in Fig. 4 would have had upon the 2007 wave of
outbreaks (see Text S1).
Supporting Information
Text S1 Supplementary information includes further details of
the computational methods used, in particular the MCMC model
fitting and epidemic tree reconstruction algorithms, and a
description of sensitivity analyses of the key results which were
carried out.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000683.s001 (0.55 MB PDF)
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